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NOTES
COURTS- EXTRAORDINARY WRITS -HABEAS CORPUS IN NORTH
DAKOTA. - The writ of habeas corpus is defined as, "a writ directed
to the person detaining another and comanding him to produce the
body of the prisoner at a certain time and place, with the day and
cause of his caption and detention, to do, submit to, and receive'
whatsoever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in
that behalf."' It is a legal process designed and employed to give
summary relief against illegal restraint of personal liberty.2 The
action cannot be called criminal as it was not created to punish the
official who affected the illegal confinement. Nor can it be called
v civil action since the relief granted is from the state and.no com-
pensation may be had from the person causing the illegal deten-
tion. The North Dakota Supreme Court merely says that it is not a
civil action nor is it a criminal action,3 so that it would seem appro-
priate to term it an extraordinary remedy.
The origin of the writ is not clear, but history records its frequent
use at the time of Henry VI, 4 and it was embodied in the English
Law by the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679.' The writ was brought to
America by the colonists and denoted as one of the immemorial
rights descended to them from their. ancestors.' The fundamental
iight to the writ is evident by its incorporation in the United States
Constitution which provides that ". . . the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when in cases of rebel-
Pon or invasion the public safety may require it ..."7
The North Dakota Constitution, has adopted the provisions for
the writ as stated in the Federal Constitution.8 North Dakota also
has statutory provisions which facilitate the procurement of the
writ.9 Although it has been said that it is a prerogative writ, it is
subject to reasonable regulations so long as its efficiency or the right
thereto is not impaired."
Every person who is imprisoned or is being restrained of his
personal liberty is entitled to prosecute the writ.1 The right to the
1. Bouvier, Law Dictionary (Rawle's, 3d Rev. 1914).
2. 2 Spelling, Injunctions and Other Extraordinary Remedies 977 (1901).
3. Carruth v. Taylor, 8 N. D. 166, 77 N.W. 617, 618 (1898) (dictum).
4. Ferris, Extraordinary Legal Remedies 22 (1926).
5. 1 Bailey, Habeas Corpus 2 (1913).
6. Ibid.
7. U. S. Const., art I, § 9, cl. 2.
8. See N. D. Const., art. 1 § 5.
9. See N. D. Rev. Code §§ 32-2201-32-2243 (1943).
10. Ferris, Extraordinary Legal Remedies 23 (1926).
11. N. D. Rev. Code § 32-2201 (1943).
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writ is not determined by his guilt or his innocence.'12 It is said that
a mere moral restraint is not sufficient to permit this right, however,
it is not necessary that there be an actual physical restraint.' 3 The
test seems to be whether or not one is deprived of going where he
pleases.' 4
The application for the writ is made by a petition signed by the
person detained or by someone in his behalf and must state in
whose interest the writ is being brought, the place of detention, the
name of the restraining officer, and the cause or pretense of the con-
finement. If the restraint is by a warrant or process a copy shall be
attached, also if the restraint is alleged illegal the petition should
state the facts constituting the illegality. The application must be
verified by the person making the application" and the writ must
ie directed to the restraining official.1" The official must be in such
control or custody of the person restrained that his body can be
produced in court, thus the writ will not lie when the petitioner is
cut on bail."1 When the petitioner has been ordered released in an
action prior to the application for the writ the question becomes
moot and the writ is accordingly denied.' 8
The writ may be granted by the supreme court or any judge
thereof,e or by the district court or any judge of the district court."
When it appears upon application to the proper court that the writ
ough to issue the same must be granted without delay." If any
judge empowered to issue the writ shall corruptly refuse to so issue
the writ, such official shall pay to the party being detained a sum
not exceeding five hundred dollars for each offense.22
APPLICATION TO CRIMINAL CASES
Habeas corpus is an important and fundamental method of test-
ing the legality of criminal process under which a person is restrain-
12. Ferris, Extraordinary Legal Remedies 30 (1926).
13. Id. at 33.
14. Green v. Wiese, 78 N.W.2d 776, 780 (N. D. 1956) (dictum). See also Ferris,
EMtraordinary Legal Remedies 32 (1926).
15. N. D. Rev. Code § 32-2203 (1943).
16. N. D. Rev. Code § 32-2207 (1943).
17. Green v. Wiese, 78 N.W.2d 776 (N. D. 1956) (The petitioner must establish that
he is being detained or restrained.).
18. State ex rel. Magrum v. Nygaard, 76 N. D. 552, 38 N.W.2d 370 (1949).
19. See N. D. Const. art 4, f 87; N. D. Rev. Code § 32-2204 (1) (1943) (The
Supreme Court has jurisdiction in every habeas corpus proceeding, but it is almost a
universal practice that the Supreme Court refuses to take jurisdiction of these cases until
an application for the writ has been made to, and refused by, a district court.).
20. See N. D. Const., art 4, § 103; N. D. Rev. Code § 32-2204 (2) (1943).
21. N. D. Rev. Code 5 32-2205 (1943).
22. N. D. Rev. Code J 32-2237 (1943).
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ed. The writ is not available as a substitute for appeal or writ of
error,2"1 but it is properly used to question the jurisdiction of the
court committing the restrained person.2 4  Proper jurisdiction em-
powers the court to determine every issue within the scope of its
authority, according to its own interpretation of the law and the evi-
dence, regardless of the correctness of the decision.2 5 Questions of
Jurisdiction have been extended to a district court's right to try a
juvenile,26 to confinement without finding the petitioner delinquent
as required by statute,27 and to the sentencing of a felon by a county
court of increased jurisdiction.2 6 The writ will not inquire into errors
which are not fatal to the jurisdiction of the court issuing the com-
mittment.29 Instances of such irregularities are where the petitioner
was not present when the jury was dismissed upon failure to decide
on a verdict,", where the district court clerk failed to indorse the
information until some four months later,1 where the petitioner
was incarcerated in the wrong jail,32 where the board of pardons
did not act with respect to a maximum-minimum sentence, 3 and,
where a defacto judge issued the order which incarcerated the
petitioner.2
4
Notwithstanding the rule that habeas corpus is not a means of
23. See Mazakahomni v. State, 75 N. D. 73, 25 N.W.2d 772 (1947) (The Supreme
Court may only inquire into the correctness of the acts of the lower court to the extent
of declaring whether it was within its jurisdiction.); State ex rel. Hagen v. Overhy, 54
N. D. 732, 210 N.W. 652 (1926); State er rel. Smith v. Lee, 53 N. D. 86, 205 N.W.
314 (1925); State ex rel. Styles v. Baeverstad, 12 N. D. 527, 97 N.W. 548 (1903).
24. See Gasch v. Kohler, 70 N. D. 358, 294 N.W. 441 (1940); State ex rel. Neville
v. Overby, 54 N. D. 295, 209 N.W. 552 (1926).
25. Ryan v. Nygaard, 70 N. D. 687, 297 N.W. 694, 700 (1941) (dictum).
26. See State ex rel. Solberg v. Sitcher, 52 N. D. 518, 203 N.W. 898 (1925).
27. Ibid.
28. See State ex rel. Stricker v. Andrews, 62 N. D. 215, 242 N.W. 912 (1932) (By
statute such county courts were giveni concurrent jurisdiction with district courts to try
offenses below the grade of felony. Petitioner was charged with aggravated assault and
battery which the North Dakota statutes defined as being a felony).
29. See Davidson v. Nygaard, 78 N. D. 141, 48 N.W.2d 578 (1951) (The court will
only determine whether the trial court had jurisdiction, if so, the application for the writ
of habeas corpus will be denied).
30. See State v. Floyd, 22 N. D. 183, 132 N.W. 662 (1911) (Petitioner's proper
remedy was by writ of error.).
31. See State ex rel. Swanson v. Lee, 53 N. D. 427, 206 N.W. 417 (1925).
32. See State ex rel. Nyhus v. Ross, 24 N. D. 586 139 N.W. 1051 (1913) (Petitioner,
a resident of Steel county where there was no jail available, was ordered imprisoned in
Traill county. The judge had overlooked an enactment which made the Cass county jail
the proper place of incarceration; the court merely ordered petitioner moved to the proper
jail).
33. See Ex parte Riley, 52 N. D. 471, 203 N.W. 676 (1925) (Petitioner was sen-
tenced from 1-5 years in the penitentiary upon being convicted of burglary in the third-
degree. Petitioner contended that since Board of Pardons had not fixed the date when
sentence shall expire that the sentence Is indefinite and he cannot be held. The court said
the mere fact that the board had not met merely revealed that they were satisfied with the
sentence as it stood and that since the minimum sentence had not expried the writ was
denied).
34. See State ex rel. Bocluneier v. Ely, 16 N. D. 569, 113 N.W. 711 (1907) (The
judge was acting as a district court judge in a district which had not, according to law,
been established and become operative. There was an erroneous belief that the district was
in existence).
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reviewing a conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction, th3
North Dakota Supreme Court has said that it will look into the
competency of the evidence upon which the magistrate exercised
his judgment.8" The evidence necessary is only that which will
make it appear that a public offense had been committed and a
belief that the accused is guilty therof.3r The supreme court will
not weigh the credibility of the witnesses in a lower court proceed-
ing.'
7
CUSTODY OF CHILDREN -DETERMINATION
The scope of the writ of habeas corpus includes the determina-
tion of the custody of children. Not only is this a determination,
but it compels relinquishment of possession and places the child in
the custody of the party who will best serve the interests and future
welfare of the child.31 In an action to contest custody of children
the mother and father are put on an equal footing.39 This rule is
set aside, however, in favor of the mother when the child is of
tender years. If the evidence shows incapacity and an illicit or im-
moral status of the mother, her position will not be favored. 4  The
courts have given preference to the father over the mother's sister,4'
and they have awarded custody to the child's foster parents over
the wishes of the natural parents.12 Where a child is of sufficient
I-ge to make an intelligent preference, his or her wishes will be
weighed, but the paramount consideration is the child's welfare.43
Habeas corpus in this type of proceeding is of an equitable
nature as it is dependent upon the welfare of the child. This type
of proceeding involves the interests of the child, the state and par-
ents, with the uppermost interest being that of the child. The order
cf the court is not a final order, and is reviewable when new facts
or a change of circumstances has occurred which has altered the
relative claims of the parties in some material respect. 44 The order
35. State ex rel. Ivetz v. Singleton, 53 N. D. 573, 207 N.W. 226 (1926) (The court
here said that, "We have examined the evidence with great care, and it is the judgment of
this court that there was some evidence and the writ must be denied."); accord, State ex
rel. Styles v. Baeverstad, 12 N. D. 527, 97 N.W. 548 (1903).
36. State ex rel. German v. Ross, 39 N. D .630, 170 N.W. 121, 122 (dictum).
'37. Ibid.
38. Ferris, Extraordinary Legal Remedies 94, 95 (1926).
39. N. D. Rev. Code § 14-0904 (1943).
40. See In re Kol, 10 N. D. 493, 88 N.W. 273 (1901).
41. See Raynrond v. Gering, 74 N. D. 142, 20 N.W.2d 335 (1945) (The child's
mother was dead and custody was given to her sister for a few days to bid farwell. When
she was asked to surrender possession she refused. The court said that even though the
mother's last wish was that the child should go to her sister that the welfare of the child
w as better achieved with her father).
42. See Ex parte Sidle, 31 N. D. 405, 154 N.W. 277 (1915).
43. See Knapp v. Tolan, 26 N. D. 23, 143 N.W. 915 (1913).
44. Larson v. Dutton, 40 N. D. 230, 168 N.W. 625, 626 (1918) (dictum).
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is final as to any possible non-jurisdictional irregularity of a prior
proceeding.
OTHER PROCEEDINGS
The North Dakota case of State ex rel. Mears v. Barnes" illus-
trates the use of habeas corpus in a contempt proceeding where the
petitioner, a corporation president, was held in contempt for the
failure to execute conveyances of real estate to the petitioner's cor-
poration. The court said that if the trial court was mistaken in de-
termining the petitioner's authority to issue the conveyance; it was
merely an erroneous decision of fact and did not affect the juris-
diction of the court to issue a contempt order. Such error in a civil
contempt can only be reviewed on appeal.4" In a similar case,
sentence was suspended and the petitioner was put on probation
when the State's Attorney of his own volition ordered the petitioner
to be taken into custody. The court granted the writ as the peti-
tioner was imprisoned without the necessary order from the pro-
bation board.4 7
Habeas corpus may also be used in extradition proceedings but
the court will not allow the admittance of evidence as to the com-
mission of the crime as that must be decided in the demanding
state.48 Further, there is in fact,.no right to go behind the determi-
nation of the Governor and to interfere with his discretion in the
premises generally.4 9
In habeas corpus proceedings that question citizenship, the court
has no right to determine whether the relator was a dangerous per-
son and should be allowed to be'at large during the time of war.50
It has been established that the constitutionality of an act may
be passed upon in a habeas corpus proceeding."l The scope of this
proceeding has been extended to the validity of a deportation
order,52 enforcement and validity of a city ordinance, 53 and to the
45. 5 N. D. 350, 65 N.W. 688 (1895).
46. Ibid.
47. State ex rel. Vadnais v. Stair, 48 N. D. 472, 185 N.W. 301 (1921).
48. See Ex parte Bruchman, 28 N. D. 358, 148 N.W. 1052 (1914).
49. Ex parte Bruchman, 28 N. D. 358, 148 N. D. 1052, 1054 (1914) (dictum).
50. See United States v. McCoy, 54 F. Supp. 679 (D. N. D. 1944) (The petitioner
was born in Alsace in Europe. The court said that being he had not been naturalized
elsewhere he was still a citizen of France, therefore, he could not be deemed to be a
German citizen).
51. See State ex rel. Gaulke v. Turner, 37 N. D. 635, 164 N.W. 924 (1917).
52. See Ex parte Gytl, 210 Fed. 918 (D. N. D. 1914) (Petitioners were lawful im-
migrants to Canada. They entered into an agreement with an American to work for him
ica North Dakota. The petitioners did not know that they were transported to the United
States and neither party knew that they had violated the Alien Labor Law. The immigra-
tion officer arrested them in violation of that law and they were ordered deported to
"whence they came from." The court -said that such an order did riot mean to deport
1957]
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validity of a warrant issued by the justice of the peace which order-
ed the removal of paupers from the state.5
4
North Dakota, by statute, has extended the scope of the writ of
habeas corpus to question the insanity or necessity of the treatment
of persons confined to state hospitals. If the court does decide that a
person is so incapacitated this does not preclude a subsequent ap-
plication for the writ for a rehearing where there has been a
material change of the circumstances.5
CONCLUSION
When a person is held in restraint and deprived of his liberty
there is no limit to the state court's jurisdiction except where he is
being held by the authority of the United States. When the federal
courts have taken jurisdiction of a suit or proceeding arising under
the constitution or laws of the United States such jurisdiction is ex-
clusive and a state court cannot interfere by habeas corpus or
otherwise.-"
Though review by habeas corpus is greatly restricted the North
Dakota Supreme Court has acknowledged their constitutional dis-
cretionary right to review prior proceedings by the use of the dis-
cretionary right of superintending control. 5 Such exercise seems to
be limited to the review of the district court proceedings as an
expedient when there is no adequate remedy available. 58
The very fundamental preservation of personal rights, by the
appropriate installation of the writ of habeas corpus in the con-
stitution, was clearly exemplified when it was said, "The writ of
habeas corpus is a great writ of liberty; no human being ever sinks
so low that he or she may not in the proper case apply to the
courts of this ]and for and obtain the benefits of this great writ."59
ARMOND G. ERICKSON.
them back to Austria, but rather back to Canada where they had been properly admitted-
to do otherwise would have been a wrong to Canada).
53. See Kist v. Butts, 71 N. D. 439, 1 N.W.2d 612 (1942) (The writ was denied and
tl.e court said that an ordinance in excess of that permitted by statute is not void and a
sentence pronounced under such an ordinance may be enforced to the extent that it Is
within the statutory limitations).
54. See Hilbern v. Briggs, 58 N. D. 612, 226 N.W. 737 (1929) (The petitioners were
residents of Minnesota, but were receiving relief in North Dakota. The statute under which
petitioners were ordered removed from the state only went so far as to say that paupers
could be moved.from one poor relief district to another, within the state of North Dakota).
55. N. D. Rev. Code 1 25-0328 (1943).
56. See 1 Bailey, Habeas Corpus 68, 69 (1913).
57. N. D. Const., art. 4, § 86.
58. See Green v. Wiese, 78 N.W.2d 776, (N. D. 1956); State ex tel. Johnson v.
Broderick, 75 N. D. 340, 27 N.W.2d 849 (1947) See also Note, 32 N. D. Law Rev.
236, 240 (1956).
59. State ex rel. Vadnais v. Stair, 48 N. D. 472, 185 N.W. 301, 303 (1921).
